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In Cumberland v Accident Compensation Corporation, the Court of Appeal held that where a 
mother is denied the information that her foetus is disabled, and thus loses the opportunity to 
terminate the pregnancy, the "continuing pregnancy" can be a personal injury covered by the 
Accident Compensation scheme. This article examines the judgment and argues the Court of Appeal 
has extended New Zealand case law on "wrongful births" without explicitly acknowledging this. The 
author suggests that, by focussing purely on the physical effects on the mother and her lost 
opportunity to determine the medical treatment given to her, the Court has avoided the value laden 
approach that has plagued other wrongful birth cases. 
I INTRODUCTION 
Cumberland v Accident Compensation Corporation (Cumberland)1 is a recent "wrongful birth" 
case in which the Court of Appeal expanded the coverage of pregnancy under the statutory Accident 
Compensation scheme (the Scheme).2 In Cumberland, the treatment provider had failed to identify 
indications of spina bifida in a 20-week foetus at an ultrasound, and so the case concerned the 
impact of the continuation of the pregnancy on the mother, rather than the conception itself. The 
Court held that the continuation of the pregnancy was a personal injury to the mother for which she 
had coverage under the Scheme. Although the Court viewed its decision as consistent with that of 
  
* BA, LLB (Hons) (Victoria University of Wellington), LLM (Toronto), Barrister and Solicitor of the High 
Court. The views expressed are those of the author and not of her employer. 
1 Cumberland v Accident Compensation Corporation [2013] NZCA 590, [2014] 2 NZLR 373 [Cumberland]. 
2 Definitions of the phrase "wrongful birth", and of "wrongful conception", vary. In this article, the term 
"wrongful birth" is used to describe cases taken by a parent alleging that, but for the negligence of a medical 
practitioner (for example, in performing a vasectomy or not advising of the potential for failure of a 
procedure), a (healthy) child would not have been conceived/born. The term "wrongful life" is generally 
used to describe a claim brought in the name of a child, who is generally disabled, that, but for the 
negligence of a medical practitioner, would not have been born. For further information, see Stephen Todd 
"Wrongful Conception, Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life" (2005) 27 Syd LR 525 at 526. 
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the Supreme Court in Allenby v Hannam (Allenby),3 a 2012 wrongful birth case, Cumberland 
represents an extension of Allenby and thus an extension of coverage for pregnancy under the 
Accident Compensation Act 2001 (the 2001 Act).4 
This article summarises the issues, reasoning and conclusions of the Court in Cumberland and 
places the case in the context of New Zealand and overseas case law. It suggests that, by focussing 
purely on the physical effects on the mother and her lost opportunity to determine the medical 
treatment given to her, the Court has avoided the value laden approach that has plagued other 
wrongful birth cases. 
II FACTS 
The appellant, Ms C, became pregnant and had a routine ultrasound scan 20 weeks into her 
pregnancy (the scan). No anatomical abnormality of the foetus was detected.5 However, at birth in 
May 2007, the baby was found to have spina bifida. The expert opinion was that the indications of 
this disease had been overlooked in the scan. In September 2007, the appellant made a claim to the 
Accident Compensation Corporation (the Corporation) for coverage for a treatment injury under the 
Act.6 She claimed the continuation of her pregnancy was a treatment injury because the incorrect 
diagnosis at the scan deprived her of the option of not continuing with the pregnancy. Ms C also 
filed a claim on behalf of the baby. The Corporation declined Ms C’s claim, but, following 
application by Ms C, the Corporation's reviewer determined that Ms C had suffered a personal 
injury covered by the 2001 Act, relying on the High Court decision in Accident Compensation 
Corporation v D (ACC v D)7 (examined briefly later). 
The Corporation successfully appealed to the District Court, and the case proceeded as a case 
stated appeal on two questions of law to the High Court. Faire J answered the questions in favour of 
the Corporation, and the appellant was granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal on the 
following question: "Has the [appellant] suffered a personal injury under the Accident 
Compensation Act 2001?". The Court ultimately gave a provisional "yes", subject to remitting the 
case to the District Court on the factual issue of whether Ms C would have been able to obtain a 
termination after the scan.  
  
3 Allenby v Hannam [2012] NZSC 33, [2012] 3 NZLR 425 [Allenby]. 
4 Originally called the Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2001, but renamed in 2010. 
5 An ultrasound scan at around 18–20 weeks of pregnancy is part of standard maternal care in New Zealand. 
A primary purpose of the scan is to examine for anatomical abnormalities in the foetus. 
6 The Corporation is the Crown entity responsible for administering New Zealand's statutory universal no-
fault accidental injury scheme. 
7 Accident Compensation Corporation v D [2007] NZAR 679 (HC) [ACC v D (HC)], appeal at [2008] NZCA 
576 [ACC v D (CA)]. 
 CASE COMMENT – CUMBERLAND V ACCIDENT COMPENSATION CORPORATION 527 
To aid in explaining the impact of the case, a short description of the legal background to 
wrongful birth cases in New Zealand is set out below. 
III HISTORY OF WRONGFUL BIRTH CASES IN NEW ZEALAND 
Eligibility under the Scheme for coverage of "wrongful birth" or pregnancy in other situations 
has been affected by repeated changes to the governing legislation.8 The 1974 amendment to the 
original 1972 Act included as an eligible "personal injury by accident" any "medical 
misadventure".9 This was taken to mean pregnancy resulting from a failed medical procedure, such 
as a failed sterilisation, could be covered.10 As well, pregnancy was specifically included as "actual 
bodily harm" that could occur from a sexual crime, and so a woman who became pregnant following 
a sexual assault would have coverage under the Scheme.11 
The significant changes to the Scheme brought by the Accident Rehabilitation and 
Compensation Insurance Act 1992 were considered in case law to have removed coverage for 
pregnancy following medical misadventure12 (although the majority of the judges in Allenby later 
doubted the 1992 statute either intended to remove coverage for pregnancy or had indeed done 
so).13 The Corporation's position, as recorded in Allenby, is that after the 1992 changes, pregnancy 
following rape was also not covered but it would pay the costs of a termination in such a case, 
treating it as treatment for a "personal injury that is a mental injury" caused by a criminal act.14 
The 2001 Act is widely regarded as returning the Scheme to more generous coverage, generally, 
and specifically in regard to medical cases. The "fault" requirement of "medical error" was removed 
and replaced by cover for personal injuries "caused by treatment".15 The claimants in Allenby and 
Cumberland sought coverage under the 2001 Act. The passage of other wrongful birth cases, 
  
8 For more information on the case law and legislative changes, see Rosemary Tobin "Common Law Actions 
on the Margin" [2008] NZ L Rev 37 at 46–52. 
9 Accident Compensation Act 1972, s 2(1) definition of "personal injury by accident", as amended by the 
Accident Compensation Amendment Act 1974, s 2(1). 
10 Although in a dissent in the Court of Appeal decision of L v M [1979] 2 NZLR 519 (CA) at 530, Cooke J 
(as he then was) doubted that such a medical misadventure would also amount to "personal injury", as it was 
medical misadventure for which the claimant was covered and the point was not decisively addressed. 
11 Accident Compensation Act 1972, s 105B(1), inserted by the Accident Compensation Amendment Act 
1974, s 6. 
12 See Tobin, above n 8, at 49 for a summary. 
13 Allenby, above n 3, at [9] per Elias CJ, at [68] and [71] per Blanchard, McGrath and William Young JJ. 
14 At [11], by reference to s 21 of that Act. 
15 Accident Compensation Act 2001, s 33. 
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particularly Allenby, through the courts is highly relevant to the decisions in Cumberland and so 
these are briefly summarised below. 
The Corporation's reviewer who allowed Ms C's claim had relied on the High Court decision of 
ACC v D in which Mallon J held that pregnancy following a failed sterilisation could be a personal 
injury.16 Her Honour's decision was then overturned on appeal, the Court of Appeal declaring 
pregnancy was not a personal injury,17 and this was relied on by the District Court and High Court 
to find in favour of the Corporation in Cumberland. However, after this, the Supreme Court gave its 
decision in Allenby, which, as the Court acknowledged in Cumberland, "expanded the arguments 
available to the appellant".18 
Allenby concerned a claim for coverage under the 2001 Act by a plaintiff who became pregnant 
following a failed sterilisation. The Supreme Court overturned earlier case law to hold that 
pregnancy that results from a failed sterilisation has cover under the 2001 Act. Indeed, two of the 
three judgments considered that it was also covered under the 1992 Act.19 All judges agreed the 
pregnancy was a personal injury caused by medical error, as defined in s 26(1)(b) of the 2001 Act. 
Blanchard J (on behalf of McGrath and William Young JJ) and Tipping J held there was coverage as 
a medical misadventure under s 20(1)(b).20 The Chief Justice wrote separately to address why she 
considered cover was also available for the pregnancy under s 20(2)(g) of the 2001 Act (as a gradual 
process injury consequent on the personal injury of impregnation) and s 20(2)(f) (as a gradual 
process injury caused by medical misadventure).21 
IV REASONING IN CUMBERLAND 
In Cumberland, the Court adopted the approach of Blanchard J in Allenby and reviewed whether 
Ms C met all three requirements of s 20(1) of the 2001 Act:22 
- the claimant suffered personal injury in New Zealand on or after 1 April 2002 (not at issue 
in this appeal); 
- the personal injury was any of the kinds of injuries described in s 26(1)(a),(b),(c) or (e); 
and 
  
16 ACC v D (HC), above n 7. For analysis of the High Court and Court of Appeal judgments, see Yasmin 
Moinfar "Pregnancy  Following  Failed  Sterilisation under the Accident Compensation Scheme" (2009) 40 
VUWLR 805 at 807–810 and 818–820.   
17 ACC v D (CA), above n 7, at [54]. 
18 Cumberland, above n 1, at [13]. 
19 Allenby, above n 3, at [71] per Blanchard J, at [9] per Elias CJ. 
20 At [76] per Blanchard J, at [95] per Tipping J. 
21 At [30] and [31]. 
22 Cumberland, above n 1, at [32]. 
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- the personal injury was described in any of the paragraphs in s 20(2). 
A Physical Injury of the Type Covered by the 2001 Act? 
Ms C argued that she had suffered a personal injury under s 26(1)(b), thus the issue, as framed 
by the Court of Appeal, was:23 
… whether continuation of the pregnancy following the incorrect diagnosis and the consequential 
inability of the mother to implement her choice to terminate the pregnancy can constitute a physical 
injury suffered by the mother for the purpose of the definition of "personal injury". 
The Court found that it was, adopting the view of Blanchard J in Allenby that the term "personal 
injury" is used in an expansive way in the 2001 Act and, by analogy with conception as a physical 
consequence of rape or following a failed sterilisation treatment, the continued pregnancy of the 
appellant following the misdiagnosed scan was capable of being a personal injury.24 
In considering whether the continuing pregnancy was a personal injury, the Court emphasised 
that the focus must be the physical consequence to the appellant in the period after the misdiagnosis, 
namely the ongoing development of the foetus. The Court observed this consequence resulted in 
ongoing physical changes to the appellant, which, although part of a natural process, "cause 
discomfort and ultimately pain and suffering".25 They agreed with Blanchard J that an analogy 
could be made with an undetected tumour (which could be eligible for coverage if a treatment 
injury).26 
In "belts and braces" reasoning, the Court of Appeal observed that the same result would occur 
if the Chief Justice's approach to physical injury in Allenby was applied; using a sprain or strain 
(which can be personal injuries) as comparators, the continuing pregnancy had a "profound impact", 
post-misdiagnosis, on the physiology of the appellant that constituted physical injury.27 The Court 
acknowledged that Ms C's situation differed from that of the claimant in Allenby, but considered 
there to be "no convincing reason", based on the text and purpose of the 2001 Act, to treat the 
ongoing physiological changes of a post 20-week pregnancy, as being outside a "personal injury" 
under s 26.28 
  
23 At [34]. 
24 At [35]. 
25 At [36]. 
26 At [36] citing Allenby, above n 3, at [80]. 
27 Cumberland, above n 1, at [37]. 
28 At [38]. 
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B Was There Treatment? And Did the Treatment Cause the Personal 
Injury? 
The last element to be met was whether Ms C had undergone "treatment" under the 2001 Act, 
which had caused the personal injury. 
First, the Court was comfortable that the misdiagnosis of the scan was caused by a treatment, 
because it came within s 33(1)(b), (c) and (d) of the non-exhaustive statutory list of possible 
treatments; that is, it related both to the diagnosis she received, to the decision on treatment to be 
provided, and to a failure to provide further treatment, for example, additional scans or tests, in a 
timely manner.29 
On the second issue, whether the personal injury was caused by the treatment, the uncontested 
evidence was that the claimant would have had the pregnancy terminated if she had been given the 
correct results of the scan. The Court discussed whether her loss of a chance to have a termination 
was sufficient causation or whether it was necessary to show on the balance of probabilities that she 
would have had an abortion. It adopted the latter approach, applying the Court of Appeal's decision 
in Accident Compensation Corporation v Ambros (Ambros).30 In Ambros, the Court considered a 
loss of a chance analysis would be incompatible with the Scheme, particularly in light of the 
changes to the statutory requirement for medical misadventure from "resulting from" to "caused by" 
in the 2001 Act. 
In Cumberland, the Corporation relied on expert medical evidence to argue the Court could not 
assume a termination would have been legally open to the claimant after a scan done at the 20 week 
stage, as s 187A(3) Crimes Act 1961 sets out a more much more limited test for abortions after 20 
weeks. The Court considered further evidence was required on this issue and referred the case back 
to the District Court for this factual matter to be determined. It made a provisional finding in favour 
of Ms C on the case stated question, holding that she was entitled to coverage under s 20(2)(b) 
(medical misadventure) and s 20(2)(f) (a gradual process injury).  
There was no determination by the Court as to the appropriate scope of the claim, but the Court 
recorded the appellant's counsel's suggestion that it might include earnings-related compensation 
both in the short-term (including during pregnancy) and arguably beyond.31 The child's claim was 
dealt with separately by the Corporation and not addressed in the judgment. 
  
29  Cumberland, above n 1, at [43]. 
30 Accident Compensation Corporation v Ambros [2007] NZCA 304, [2008] 1 NZLR 340 as cited by 
Cumberland, above n 1, at [46]–[48]. 
31 Cumberland, above n 1, at [59]. 
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V ANALYSIS 
The Court of Appeal in Cumberland was at pains to emphasise that its judgment was analogous 
with the Supreme Court's decision in Allenby. However, the Court's treatment of a "continuing 
pregnancy" extended the existing case law.  
The reasoning of the majority of the Supreme Court in Allenby referred to the claimant 
"becoming" pregnant, with the impregnation being the result of the medical misadventure, and the 
pregnancy a continuation of the injury analogous to a disease or infection. For example, Blanchard J 
said:32 
The development of the fetus following impregnation occurs because of the medical error, just as in the 
case of the undetected tumour. It causes significant physical changes to the woman's anatomy, which of 
course occur naturally but still cause discomfort and, at least ultimately, pain and suffering. If a disease 
or infection consequential on medical misadventure can be classified by the statute as a personal injury, 
it does not involve any greater stretching of language to similarly include a pregnancy which has the 
same cause. 
The Chief Justice's conclusion does separate impregnation and a continuing pregnancy in her 
consideration of coverage for the injury, stating:33 
A woman who becomes pregnant following a failed sterilisation suffers personal injury in the 
impregnation caused by medical misadventure within the cover provided by s 20(2)(b) and further 
personal injuries during the pregnancy "caused by a gradual process that is personal injury caused by 
medical misadventure" within the cover provided by s 20(2)(f)). 
One possible way to read the Allenby and Cumberland decisions consistently is to view the 
personal injury of the plaintiff as "a state". For example, following the Allenby approach, a claimant 
who becomes pregnant following a failed sterilisation is eligible for coverage because she now has 
the personal injury of being pregnant, a state involving pain and discomfort she had wished to 
avoid.34 In the case of the injury of a "continuing pregnancy" as in Cumberland, the claimant was 
(presumably) prepared to be in the state of pregnancy, but not to be "pregnant with a foetus with 
spina bifida". The misdiagnosis has prevented the claimant from exercising her choice to obtain 
treatment to no longer be in this state. She is pregnant and does not know the foetus has spina bifida 
until the child is born. There is no evidence recorded in the Cumberland judgment that the physical 
  
32 Allenby, above n 3, at [80] (emphasis added). See also [76] per Blanchard J. 
33 Allenby, above n 3, at [31] (emphasis added). 
34 This takes the case into the realm of personal choice and "autonomy": see Swati Jhaveri "Judicial Strategies 
in Recognising New Areas for Recovery in Negligence – Lessons Learned from Wrongful Conception 
Cases" (2013) 21 Tort L Rev 63 at 67. In New Zealand, the issue of whether the effect of pregnancy itself is 
a personal injury was determined by the Supreme Court in Allenby, above n 3. 
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effects of the pregnancy or birth were greater or different for the mother because the foetus had 
spina bifida. Therefore, the physical injury that she suffers is, in one regard, the same, but the 
mother is in a state in which she does not wish to be.35 This is similar to dealing with the 
misdiagnosis as a legal wrong to the detriment of the patient's autonomy to determine her health 
treatment, but fits within the confines of a personal injury covered by the 2001 Act.36 
Perhaps the Court of Appeal has skirted over this issue and not highlighted the difference 
between the impregnation and a continuing pregnancy as a recognition of reproductive rights. For 
example, in Allenby, Tipping J recognised the right of a woman to choose whether to become 
pregnant and stated: "If she does not wish to do so, the consequences of her becoming pregnant are 
not to be discounted because pregnancy per se is a natural process."37 Perhaps underlying 
Cumberland is a recognition of the appellant's right to decide whether to continue with a pregnancy 
when correctly advised of the health of the foetus. The Court did recognise the claimant's decision 
must have been within the confines of New Zealand's abortion laws as it referred the case back to 
the District Court to determine whether the plaintiff, correctly advised, would have been legally able 
to access a termination. There is certainly no discussion in the judgment of "the blessing of a child", 
no comparison of raising a disabled child with a healthy child, and no use of the other value laden 
language that is so often a part of wrongful birth and wrongful life cases.38 This is a welcome 
approach to such cases. 
The focus on the plaintiff's injury/state rather than "values" is perhaps helped by the Court in 
both Cumberland and Allenby dealing with the applicants' claim purely in the language of 
entitlement under the Scheme rather than looking to overseas case law. The overseas cases, working 
through these factual situations at the edges of existing tort law, have involved greater discussion of 
policy issues, although often by reference to "distributive justice" factors. This is despite the fact 
  
35 Professor Todd has suggested that in a case where the parents themselves have decided to forgo their 
autonomy and have a child, but the child is born disabled, the defendant might be responsible for the 
disability costs, but not for any loss of autonomy: see Stephen Todd The Law of Torts in New Zealand (6th 
ed, Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2013) at [6.9.04]. 
36 There is also the common law example of Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust [2004] 1 AC 
309 (HL) [Rees] where a disabled women had a child following a failed sterilisation. The majority of the 
House of Lords stated that the plaintiff's right to choose the way in which she lived had been invaded and 
for that legal wrong she was entitled to an award of damages. Rees has been criticised for creating a new 
head of damages in the law of damages: see for example Sandra Birgitta Elste "Analysis of Common Law 
Judgments in Regards of Wrongful Birth Cases" (4) New Zealand Postgraduate Law e-Journal 1 at 22–23. 
37 Allenby, above n 3, at [89]. 
38 In the leading English wrongful birth case of McFarlane v Tayside Health Board [2000] 2 AC 59 (HL) at 96 
and 113–114 respectively, Lord Millett said the birth of a child brought incalculable benefits to the parents 
and Lord Hope opined the birth of a child would always be a blessing. 
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that in cases regarding the Scheme, courts do sometimes look to the common law to examine 
overseas developments, to the benefit of New Zealand law.39 
There had been some overseas cases regarding "continuing pregnancies" although these have 
generally addressed claims for expenses/damages for the child rather than the issue of personal 
injury to the mother, and/or were brought by the disabled child (ie wrongful life claims).40 
Whitehead v Searle41 arose from a similar fact situation to Cumberland, a child born with 
undetected spina bifida. However, it was ultimately determined as a claim by the father for damages 
against solicitors for their delay in prosecuting the mother's claim against the health provider prior to 
her death. Laws LJ (with whom Rimer LJ agreed) briefly examined what could have happened had 
the claim been brought by the father against the health authority, and said that recovery would turn 
on evidence as to whether the mother would have terminated her pregnancy if she had known of the 
foetus' defect. The judges indicated the mother could have sought damages for pain, suffering and 
loss of amenity, and the additional costs of raising a disabled child.42 
VI CONCLUSION 
Cumberland establishes that the continuation of a pregnancy may be a personal injury for which 
a claimant may receive coverage under the Scheme. The claimant will, of course, still have to 
establish that the personal injury was caused by a treatment injury for which there is coverage under 
the 2001 Act. 
  
39 Professor McLay argues that there is particular benefit in looking at common law developments indicating 
the need for change or growth, particularly in areas at the margins of tort law such as wrongful birth cases: 
Geoff McLay "Accident Compensation – What's the Common Law Got to Do with It?" [2008] NZ L Rev 55 
at 62. He suggests that the overseas case law assisted Mallon J in ACC v D (HC), above n 7, at [55]–[56] to 
reach her conclusions about the coverage of pregnancy in the ACC scheme. 
40 See for example, CES v Superclinics (Australia) Pty Ltd [1995] NSWSC 103 where the claimant sought 
damages in a negligence action alleging doctors had failed to diagnose her pregnancy.  She claimed this had 
led to a "loss of opportunity" to terminate the pregnancy, and claimed damages for the pain and suffering of 
the pregnancy and birth, and for the economic loss of raising the child. The majority held she could not 
claim damages for the cost of raising her child as she had chosen not to adopt the child out at its birth, see 
Priestley J at [34] and Meagher JA at [11]. 
41 Whitehead v Searle [2008] EWCA Civ 285, [2009] 1 WLR 549. 
42 At [2] and [19] per Laws LJ, and [70]–[72] and [78] per Rimer LJ. The position regarding wrongful births in 
England is that the mother of a child born following a failed sterilisation can claim general damages for the 
pain and suffering of pregnancy and childbirth and associated expenses but not child-raising: see for 
example McFarlane v Tayside Health Board, above n 3838. A gloss was placed on this in Rees, above n 36, 
awarding damages in recognition of the "legal wrong" done to the plaintiff, rather than for the costs of 
raising a child. Further, where a child is born disabled, the courts have allowed for expenses specifically 
related to that disability: Parkinson v St James Seacroft University Hospital Trust [2001] EWCA Civ 530, 
[2002] QB 266. The leading Australian case of Cattanach v Melchoir (2003) 215 CLR 1 (HCA) upheld the 
claim of parents for the costs of raising an unplanned child following a failed sterilisation. 
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If the legislature disagrees with the outcomes of Allenby and Cumberland, it could respond by 
amending the legislation of the Scheme. Alternatively, if it agrees with eligibility in wrongful birth 
cases, it could make coverage of pregnancy (and the bounds of eligibility) explicit in the legislation. 
Associate Professor Rosemary Tobin has called for such statutory elaboration in order to act within 
the spirit of the Woodhouse Report,43 without doing violence to the definitions in the existing 
legislation.44 After all, some judges in the English and Australian cases have been clear that 
recovery for wrongful birth in tort law is, at its core, an issue of public policy.45 In response to the 
leading Australian wrongful birth case of Cattanach v Melchoir,46 Queensland (where the case 
originated) passed legislation limiting claimants' ability to recover common law damages in 
wrongful birth cases.47 Until then, the courts will continue to develop case law on the Scheme in a 
piecemeal fashion, adding the weight of case law on to an already unwieldy and incoherent statute. 
 
  
43 New Zealand Royal Commission of Inquiry into Compensation for Personal Injury Compensation for 
Personal Injury in New Zealand (13 December 1967) [Woodhouse Report]. The Woodhouse Report, named 
for the chair, the Rt Hon Sir Owen Woodhouse, was set up to investigate complaints into New Zealand's 
then worker compensation scheme.  It made recommendations that were the genesis for the introduction of 
the no-fault universal accidental injury scheme via the Accident Compensation Act 1972. 
44 Tobin, above n 8, at 53. 
45 See for example: Rees, above n 36, at [52]; Lord Steyn's comments in McFarlane v Tayside Health Board, 
above n 38, at 81–83 (although he denies his opinion is based on public policy factors); and the extensive 
discussion of the role of policy in such cases in Kirby J's decision in Cattanach v Melchoir, above n 42, at 
49 and 52–54. 
46 Cattanach v Melchoir, above n 42. 
47  Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), ss 49A and 49B. Similar provisions exist in New South Wales (Civil 
Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 71) and South Australia (Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 67), although these 
states provide specific exemptions for the additional costs arising where the child has a disability. 
